Philosophical Foundations of Qualitative Organizational Research by Neesham C
1 
 
Date printed: 
Word count: 10523 
 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF QUALITATIVE ORGANIZATIONAL 
RESEARCH 
 
Cristina Neesham 
 
THE NATURE OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: REFLEXIVITY AND 
PHILOSOPHY 
 
Qualitative social research has traditionally been distinguished from its quantitative 
counterpart by its commitment to asking ‘why’, ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions about social 
phenomena – rather than ‘how much’ and ‘to what extent’ questions. Its vocation is 
therefore to discover or interpret the substance of social life rather than measure any 
particular dimensions of it (Denzin and Lincoln 1998; Denzin and Lincoln 2011; 
Spencer et al. 2014). In this process, the researcher as subject of knowledge and 
valuation engages in illuminating not only the reality they are studying but also 
themselves in relation to that reality and their participation in it. As Spencer et al. 
(2014: 1) put it, ‘qualitative research is an engaged way of building knowledge about 
the social world and human experience, and qualitative researchers are enmeshed in 
their projects’. Thus, qualitative research is not just a complement set to answer 
questions that quantitative research cannot address, but represents a distinct body of 
research practices, with its own rigours and standards (Denzin and Lincoln 2011). One 
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such distinctive characteristic of qualitative research is its propensity for reflecting on 
its own practice and on the relationship between researcher and researched. Within this 
relational process, qualitative inquiry is, by its very nature, bound to delve more deeply 
into foundational, philosophical questions. 
 
Although explicit reflection on one’s own philosophical assumptions is a matter of crucial 
importance for both quantitative and qualitative research, thus suggesting that the 
distinction between the two approaches may have been overplayed, it has been recognized 
as a prominent feature of the latter, based on an understanding of social phenomena as 
open to complex, unpredictable change and influence from the researcher’s gaze as 
creative of worlds rather than merely recording external stimuli ((Morgan and Smircich 
1980: 498):  
Quantitative techniques may have an important but only partial role to play in the 
analysis and understanding of the process of social change… The requirement for 
effective research in these situations is clear: scientists can no longer remain as 
external observers, measuring what they see; they must move to investigate from 
within the subject of study and employ research techniques appropriate to that 
task.   
Qualitative research is therefore at home in the social sciences, expanding the breadth and 
depth of the research effort to more appropriate levels.  
 
Just as for quantitative research, the philosophical foundations of qualitative research 
refer to certain assumptions that its various paradigms and approaches have to rely on, 
by logical necessity, in explaining and justifying themselves – in terms of their various 
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interpretations of the nature of the phenomena under study; the role and status of the 
researcher; the nature of the relationship between researcher, other human beings and 
(non-human) phenomena; and the defining features of the research process as a relation 
between theory and practice. As a social process of inquiry for the purposes of 
advancing knowledge, research is inescapably grounded in the researcher’s worldview 
(Geertz 1989). Therefore, its philosophical propositions, as answers to first-order 
questions, are omnipresent, whether acknowledged or not. Even a researcher who 
dismisses the need for philosophical reflection on the basis that their job is to respond to 
the question ‘What is happening out there?’ by simply reporting what they observe 
takes the implicit stance that one can know reality as it is, without mediation – thus 
plunging into one of the most controversial ideas in the history of philosophy.  
 
At the heart of any ‘why’ question in qualitative inquiry there is a philosophical axiom – 
that is, a proposition believed to be self-evident or to require no demonstration, which 
logically establishes the truth of all other valid inferences made in the research process. 
This axiom is of philosophical interest in that it ultimately relates to a first-order, all-
encompassing, universal question of the kind: what is the nature of reality? of human 
knowledge? of value? of purposeful human action? But what an empirical researcher is 
prepared to take for granted can cause headaches for generations of philosophers. 
Reflecting philosophically on our research axioms enables us to maintain our 
intellectual acuity under the pressure of the most numbing analgesics.  
 
One such analgesic dwells in the separation of organizational research from primary 
social research domains such as sociology, psychology, anthropology, economics and 
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political science. Our focus on organizational research here does not seek to tear it away 
from its humanist roots in order to justify instrumentalist objectives as points of 
distinction. On the contrary, it is meant to illuminate how specific concerns of 
organizational research are related to and embedded in the broader concerns of primary 
social inquiry. Hence, the purpose of this chapter is to explore the types of philosophical 
questions addressed in the assumptions adopted by various streams of qualitative 
organizational research; discuss the various paradigms, conceived as sets of 
philosophical assumptions, their influence on the study of organizations, and 
approaches to paradigm classification most popularly adopted in this field; and evaluate 
the challenges and opportunities experienced by qualitative researchers in advancing 
humanist (rather than instrumentalist) knowledge of organizations in theoretically sound 
and practically meaningful ways.  
 
PHILOSOPHICAL SPHERES IN QUALITATIVE ORGANIZATIONAL 
RESEARCH 
 
Traditionally, philosophical assumptions in qualitative social research have been 
grouped into three main categories – labelled as pertaining to ontology (as philosophy 
of existence and reality), epistemology (as philosophy of knowledge), and axiology (as 
philosophy of value). Due to our focus on the study of organizations, our discussion of 
philosophical foundations of qualitative inquiry has five important points of departure 
from similar explorations of qualitative social research in general. First, we emphasize 
the particular relevance of ontological assumptions of becoming and not only of being, 
about processes and not only about states – by illustrating the role of process philosophy 
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in enriching the theoretical perspectives of organizational research. Second, we nuance 
the objectivist-subjectivist distinction employed in classifying organizational ontologies 
and epistemologies (see Burrell and Morgan 1979) by appealing to fallibilism as a meta-
critique of knowledge claims, and thus opening the possibility for more refined 
perspectives on ‘constructs of dubious ontological status’ typically produced in 
organizational research, such as ‘structure, culture, leadership’ (Powell 2001: 24) and 
even organization itself. Third, we distinguish between axiology (as the domain of 
meta-ethics and theory of value) and its applications, in the form of ethics and politics 
of value – and we take a closer look at the role of ethical and political questions in 
informing various research paradigms in the study of organizations. Fourth, we 
distinguish between the concept of ‘methodology’ in philosophy (as reflection on the 
practice of philosophy itself) and the role of philosophical assumptions (usually 
belonging to one of the other philosophical categories – such as ontology, epistemology, 
or ethics) in legitimating the methodology of empirical organizational research. Finally, 
we add to the discussion the rather neglected philosophical area of praxeology, as 
foundational reflection on the nature of purposeful human action, hence of both research 
practice and organizational action as particular cases of it. Praxeological assumptions 
are particularly important in organizational research because they provide the logic 
underpinning the relationships among modalities of existence, possibility and value, and 
they indicate how these modalities should be articulated and integrated in legitimizing 
the research project. Hence, we will discuss questions pertaining to four philosophical 
spheres – namely, the ontological, epistemological, axiological and praxeological – and 
relate them to issues of research practice that are specific to organizational inquiry.  
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The Ontological Sphere  
 
Ontology is the domain of philosophy that deals with questions about being and 
becoming. The nature of reality – that is, of what exists, in whatever form or process, 
whether independently or in some relation to us (and to other ‘things’ that exist) – is its 
concern. Hence, most statements in ontology are ‘is’ statements. In other words, the 
language of ontology relies on modalities of existence.  
 
Organizational qualitative research practice shares with the wider domain of social 
research in general the preoccupation for cogently explaining the nature and status of 
various phenomena under study, especially in relationship with the nature and status of 
the inquirer (Delanty 2005; Denzin and Lincoln 2011; Rosenberg 2008). Hence, some 
social research theorists have found it difficult to separate between ontological and 
epistemological questions in this domain (see Burrell and Morgan 1979). It does, 
however, also raise specific questions about the organization, our central object of 
inquiry. Such questions could be: what kind of ‘thing/it’ is an organization? what kind 
of reality is it an example of? what kind of ‘things’/reality/realities exist in, and in 
relation with, an organization? and, what is the nature of (organizational) reality for an 
organizational researcher? Does the fact that we tend to approximate definitions of 
organizations by metaphors (see Morgan 1997) indicate an ontological complexity we 
are not quite prepared for?  
 
As an alternative to analogical-metaphorical thinking, some organization theorists have 
taken an active interest in process metaphysics (see Whitehead 1929/1967; Bergson 
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1946; Rescher 1996) in order to better explain how organizational phenomena, never 
static, morph and de-morph continuously in successions of emergent events rather than 
designed structures. This increasingly influential body of work has played a crucial role 
in contemporary developments in the study of identity (Schultz 2012), materiality 
(Carlile et al. 2013), sensemaking (Hernes and Maitlis 2010) and change (Langley et al. 
2013) in organizations.  
 
The Epistemological Sphere 
  
Epistemology’s representative action verbs are: knowing; believing and doubting; 
verifying and falsifying. Most generally, this sphere deals with how we human beings 
acquire and develop knowledge about reality. The language of epistemology is therefore 
dominated by ‘can’ propositions – or, otherwise put, the modality of possibility.  
 
The qualitative organizational researcher shares with the social researcher in other fields 
a concern for the quality of evidence and its role in establishing trustworthy belief, in 
developing sound criteria for such trustworthiness (Denzin and Lincoln 2011). 
Furthermore, they both ask themselves: do we access the ‘reality’ under study as it is, or 
are there angles, filters, biases and limits in our attempts to understand it?  
 
More specifically, however, the organizational researcher is interested in understanding 
the nature of the knowledge involved in the particular ways in which organizational 
phenomena can be known. Reflection on foundational epistemological commitments is 
essential to good research practice, helping the researcher understand and cope with the 
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realization that making such commitments is unavoidable, while any particular 
commitment is contestable (Johnson and Cassell 2001). The objective-subjective 
dichotomy most often used in encapsulating the range of researchers’ views of the 
nature of the knowledge they produce, namely, as truth available out there, 
independently of the enquirer, versus as a reciprocal construction of belief in the 
interaction between researcher and researched, can be both transcended and relativized 
by considerations of fallibilism, whereby the possibility of not knowing (or failing to 
know) the truth of any epistemological premise is never completely removed, in any 
process of inquiry, however coherent (Gettier 1963). It is philosophical reflection that 
enables us to ask critical questions such as (Powell 2001: 23):  
 
Which theories of truth… do organizational researchers explicitly or tacitly 
accept? What kinds of propositions… dominate organizational discourse? What 
foundations… do organizational researchers use to justify knowledge claims? In 
what sense to organizational researchers regard their claims as true and 
warranted?  
In doing so, qualitative research paves the way for suitably comprehensive reflection on 
social phenomena for quantitative analysis as well.  
 
The Axiological Sphere  
 
By definition, axiology deals with value and (particularly relevant for organizational 
research) valuing. Its propositions are mainly modals of obligation and normativity – 
that is, they are ‘should’ propositions. Their subject is the nature of value and valuing 
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processes. It has been said that, in social research, axiological assumptions refer to the 
values of the researcher and how they influence the research process (Spencer et al. 
2014), but studying organizations adds new layers of complexity to axiological 
questions, which require deeper levels of reflection on the challenges posed by 
organizations and their management practices, as symbolic realities (Kostera 2012; 
McKinlay et al. 2012), to the researcher-researched relationship.  
 
In this chapter, we will set aside primary axiological questions, such as what is the 
nature of value?, and explore instead two of its discrete applications, in the form of 
ethics (which deals with values of the Good), and political philosophy of value (which 
deals with values related to the Powerful, or Power). Questions of ethics in qualitative 
organizational research are, fundamentally, concerned with reasons why the research is 
considered worthwhile, with its ultimate purpose. Here one can identify, across the 
field, a wide range of answers, from those anchoring the Good in meeting the needs of 
organizations and management practitioners (Argyris 1964, 1993; Herzberg et al. 1959; 
McGregor 1960) to those that go beyond organizational rationale and give primacy to 
improvements in the human condition – be it in the well-being of individuals, groups, 
communities, or society more generally (Dierksmeier 2016; Mele 2016). Whether 
instrumentalist or humanist, or enacting combinations in between, organizational 
researchers will adopt an ethical stance, be it explicit or tacit.  
 
In the realm of normativity there are also political questions to be addressed, such as: 
what is the role of the researcher? should research inquiry convert into, or be driven by, 
a political agenda? and, if so, what should this agenda be set to achieve? In this context, 
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the politics of research calls for ethical justifications of its own (Rosenberg 2008). The 
reflective researcher will not only be interested in understanding who benefits from their 
research, or whose interests are well represented and whose are ignored or undermined, 
but will also be prepared to question the political and ethical legitimacy of a variety of 
qualitative research approaches, including their preferred stance: on what ethical basis 
should the premises of the research project’s political agenda, or their political 
implications, be accepted? Increasingly, organizational theorists have grown to 
acknowledge that all research has political implications – even when no political goals 
are explicitly adopted. The usual effect of the latter is one of adding epistemic 
legitimacy and support to the social and political status quo (Dehler and Welsh 2016; 
Klikauer 2014). It is therefore not surprising that a counterbalancing research agenda, 
aimed at voice-giving and emancipation of the subordinate, the disadvantaged, the 
vulnerable and the oppressed has to not only to be explicit but also challenge the very 
possibility of value neutrality in organizational research generally, irrespective of 
theoretical-philosophical persuasion.  
 
The Praxeological Sphere 
 
Understood as the philosophical domain studying purposeful human action (Alexandre 
and Gasparski 2000; Kotarbinski 1965), praxeology can be defined in terms of 
choosing, (en)acting, applying, practising and performing.  Therefore, we argue, it is to 
this heading that our theoretical discussions of methodology in organizational research 
should be more appropriately subsumed, given that insights into the philosophy of 
designing purposeful human action have a central role in the conceptualization of 
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research methodology applications as both structured and agentic practice. In support of 
this suggestion, we note that methodologically reflective questions (that is, meta-
questions) about research design are often so similar, in essence, to praxeological 
questions, understood in a broad (non-economistic) sense. Keen to address the 
confusion, often encountered in the literature, between philosophical and derived 
(second-order, empirical domain-generated) questions in research methodology, 
Delanty (2005), for example, clearly distinguishes between philosophy and 
methodology in social research.  
 
Appeal to praxeology enables us to discuss in a more systematic fashion important 
debates in organizational theory around the performativity and anti-performativity of 
particular kinds of research practices and critiques (Delbridge 2014; Fleming and 
Banerjee 2016; Schaefer and Wickert 2016). Moreover, for organizational research, 
Bourdieu’s social praxeology (Bourdieu 1977, 1990) is particularly relevant, as it 
explores the possibilities of research as action upon and produced by organizations as 
symbolically mediated entities (Everett 2002).  
 
RESEARCH PARADIGMS IN ORGANIZATION STUDIES: EXOGENOUS 
INFLUENCES AND ENDOGENOUS ISSUES 
 
Inspired by epistemologies of the natural sciences, social research has a long tradition of 
grouping its practices into paradigms. According to Kuhn (1962/2012), a scientific 
paradigm is an exemplary way of practising research generally accepted by a 
community of researchers, in a given period. A paradigm is informed by a particular 
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worldview and, related to it, a particular perspective on the purpose, nature, structure 
and standards of the research process. Its most fundamental assumptions about the 
research world – including multiple and nuanced relations between researcher and 
researched – are philosophical, most usually pertaining to the four spheres previously 
discussed. It is a well-established convention in philosophical explorations of qualitative 
social research to outline and structure the evolution of theoretical thinking in the field 
in terms of a (more or less) historical sequence of paradigms (see Creswell 2014; Crotty 
1998; Delanty 2005; Denzin and Lincoln 1998; Guba and Lincoln 1994; Ormston et al. 
2013; Prasad 2002; Trigg 2001).  
 
For the purposes of a summarized discussion, four of the broadest, most distinctive 
paradigms have been selected here: namely (post)positivism, social constructionism, 
critical inquiry, and pragmatism. In focusing on the first three, we are guided by 
Habermas’s (1971/2015) analysis of knowledge as related to human interests. 
Accordingly, the connection between empirical and analytical research approaches and 
technical interests is represented by (post)-positivism; historical and hermeneutic 
knowledge directed by practical interests is discussed under social constructivism; while 
critical inquiry reflects critically oriented (and, one may say, subversive) knowledge 
driven by emancipatory interests. We add pragmatism as one of the most influential 
paradigms of social research since Habermas’s categorization was published. We will 
explore the key features of each of the four paradigms in turn below, also with reference 
to sub-paradigms that have proven relevant in the study of organizations.  
 
Post-Positivism 
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Following anti-positivist critiques in both natural and social sciences, post-positivism 
amends and improves, philosophically and methodologically, on a position that remains, 
in essence, ontologically realist and epistemologically objectivist. While confidence in 
absolute, universal, complete and non-interventionist knowledge may have waned under 
the influence of Heisenberg’s indeterminacy principle (Lindley 2008), Popper’s (1964) 
falsificationist criteria (Popper 2005) and Gettier’s (1963) fallibilist argument (Powell 
2001), in post-positivism the researcher’s orientation for methodological development is 
still guided by the goal of apprehending reality (believed as identifiable, in significant 
ways, as independent of our consciousness) through as little intrusion and influence as 
possible. Truth is still to be discovered rather than constructed, with testability, 
replication and predictability remaining central concerns for the research project – 
although, unlike in classical positivism, the ultimate goal is now probability rather than 
certainty. For the post-positivist researcher, the world, regarded as a collection of 
objects, can be known, albeit partially, with satisfactory approximation to its objective 
state, using methods based on rigorously assessed evidence. Unified and unifying 
standards of evidence assessment continue to represent the progressive ideal of the 
disciplined researcher, who should perfect their instruments to reduce impact of their 
own intervention and bias, and to exclude value judgments. 
 
An incursion into the evolution of organizational qualitative research literature suggests 
that, to start with, post-positivism is not meant to be the natural ground for qualitative 
research anyway, as the latter has historically distinguished itself and gained 
independent legitimacy by promoting interpretive methods that break with foundational 
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realism and objectivism altogether. Yet editors of major organizational research journals 
continue to report that a significant amount of qualitative post-positivist research is 
consistently being submitted and published in the field (see Rynes and Gephart 2004; 
Skinner et al. 2000). They also signal combinations of qualitative and quantitative 
methods, and draw our attention to potential pitfalls created by using research standards 
and criteria unreflectively. Although it may appear easier to invest in confidence in our 
epistemic proximity to reality, as it seems to reduce the need for scrutinizing 
discrepancies between the world and our mental models, potential limitations and 
distortions induced by the research process may eventually compromise the value of the 
research endeavour itself.  
 
We note that, in the positivist tradition of organization studies, qualitative research is 
treated as complementary to its quantitative counterpart, in recognition of the fact that 
the two streams specialize in addressing different types of research questions. Anti-
positivist critiques have played an important role in qualitative research gaining both 
theoretical and empirical ground in more recent times. For example, a topic such as 
human needs in organizations, once dominated by positivism and quantitative methods 
(see the industrial psychology movement directed by the works of Herzberg, McGregor, 
McClelland, and others), have more recently been rejuvenated through qualitative 
methods driven by interpretive and critical perspectives (Contu et al. 2010; Hancock 
1999; Townley 1995).  
 
Social Constructionism 
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Made explicit in Berger and Luckmann’s book The Social Construction of Reality 
(1966), the notion of social constructionism opposes the key ontological and 
epistemological tenets of positivism and post-positivism by arguing that social reality is 
not populated by objects but created by subjects through their experiences and 
relationships. Social context dependent, Reality can consist of multiple realities. This is 
because knowledge is mediated by meaning creation – a process characterized not by 
discovery but by social interaction and negotiation. There is no knowledge until the data 
is interpreted – and interpretation is a matter of inter-subjective construction, not 
objective emergence.  
 
The relativism introduced in social research by social constructionist positions, 
primarily through the privileging of qualitative approaches (Czarniawska 2009; Holstein 
and Miller 2006), has led to a proliferation of varieties of social constructionism, 
identified by some theorists as historical-genealogical, discursive, narrative, 
interpretive, claim-making, and contextual (see Holstein and Gubrium 2013), or as 
symbolic interactionism, phenomenology, ethnomethodology and hermeneutics 
(Spencer et al. 2014). In this context, organizational research has proven a fertile ground 
for the application of social constructionism. Some theorists have even argued that the 
whole domain of administrative science, for example, can only produce subjective, 
socially constructed truth. As the dominant medium of social knowledge is language, 
organizational researchers necessarily produce language that is ambiguous, 
metaphorical, performative. As such, language structures and shapes the knowledge it 
identifies and communicates (Astley 1985). With the ‘linguistic turn’ as the clearest and 
strongest feature of anti-positivism (Rorty 1992), the Enlightenment’s ideal of 
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transparent and exact scientific language as a neutral vehicle for universal knowledge is 
dealt a lethal blow.  
 
Most streams of social constructionism theorized by philosophers of the social sciences 
have had their schools of thought and seminal effects on qualitative organizational 
research. We will expand on two of the most representative sub-genres of social 
constructionism here – namely, phenomenology, and historical-genealogical studies – in 
each case emphasizing research challenges that are specific to the study of 
organizations.  
  
The phenomenological approach has its origins in the philosophy of Edmund Husserl 
(1931), whose core tenet is that our experiences are the source of all our knowledge of 
reality. Thus, the phenomena we can and should study are not events as they occur in 
the world but our experiences of those events. The outcomes of research are not neutral 
accounts of independent objects of inquiry but explicitly acknowledge characteristics of 
experiencing subjects (including the researcher), of the ways they make sense of the 
world through their experiences. For phenomenologist social researchers (see Sanders 
1982), there is no social reality other than that created by people’s perceptions, moulded 
by their social context. As Husserl (1931) explains, the centrepiece of 
phenomenological research is intentional analysis, which focuses on intentionality as 
the relationship between the external source of the subject’s experience and its effects in 
the subject’s consciousness. This approach is further developed by Heidegger (1988) 
into hermeneutics, an interpretive philosophical method coherent with the ontological 
and epistemological tenets of phenomenology.  
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Husserl’s and Heidegger’s ideas have been summarized and applied for the purposes of 
qualitative research in the social sciences by Moustakas (1994), who describes as 
specific to phenomenological research those methodologies anchored in ethnography, 
grounded theory, hermeneutics, empirical phenomenological study, and heuristic 
research. Empirical phenomenological research, in particular, relies on the analysis of 
subjective accounts of events, provided by individuals who are interviewed and/or 
observed in a privileged position of experiencing those events. In the study of 
organizations, Sanders (1982) outlines a phenomenological research model for the 
discipline of management, stating its main contribution to the field in terms of a 
significant enhancement of the researcher’s ability to delve into the deeper structures of 
phenomena, in ways that would not be available to the established scientific-normative 
paradigms. However, as Gill (2014) remarks, very few organizational studies have 
actually applied Sanders’ model. Other sources of reference have been Giorgi (2010) 
and Smith (2004) in psychology, Van Manen (1989) in education, and Benner and 
Wrubel (1989) in nursing. Gill (2014) suggests that there are at least two directions 
available for organizational research to advance knowledge using phenomenological 
methodologies. The first is to refer to the philosophical work of Merleau-Ponty (1964), 
by paying attention to the relationship between conscience and body, their role in 
shaping experiences – and thus making embodied experiences the focus of research into 
organizational phenomena. The second makes appeal to Schütz’s sociology (1967), in 
particular his idea of inter-subjectivity. Schütz’s work has already generated important 
streams in the organizational studies field, such as sense-making research (see Weick 
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1995), but its potential for studying various types of organizations as inter-subjectively 
generated social worlds is much wider.  
 
The historical-genealogical approach, largely represented by the philosophical and 
methodological ideas of Michel Foucault (Discipline and Punish 1977/1979, The 
History of Sexuality 1980-1990, The Care of the Self 1988), has exercised for decades a 
significant influence on qualitative organizational research. As explained by Miller 
(2013), Foucault’s work guides our understanding of how discursive constructions of 
human beings into subjects (as subjected objects of power) occur in organizations. The 
socially created subjects of reality are disciplined into being through techniques of 
surveillance, understood as hierarchical observation, and normalizing judgment, that is 
the evaluation of individuals by reference to a given standard of normality. Thus, 
socially institutionalized power produces both ontologically (i.e. forms and structures of 
‘reality’) and epistemologically (i.e. ‘objects and rituals of truth’) (Foucault 1979: 194). 
Like prisons, hospitals, schools and universities, organizations of all kinds apprehend 
individuals as docile bodies disciplined through discourse. But it is the organization’s 
dominant discourse that defines normality, not autonomous voices of individuals – thus 
sentencing the silenced alternatives to powerlessness, vulnerability and disadvantage. 
The extraordinary self-reproducing power of this dominant discourse resides in its 
ability to incorporate into its self-established structures concern for the needs of 
individuals and for their agency, transforming them into voluntary instruments of their 
own alignment with their organizationally defined identity – and, therefore, instruments 
of their own control by the organization. 
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Using a Foucauldian lens, Fairhurst and Putnam (2004) identify three ways in which the 
relationship between discourse and organization can be interpreted – namely, as an 
‘object’, as a condition of ‘becoming’, or as ‘grounded in action’ (Fairhurst and Putnam 
2004: 10). They advocate for all three perspectives to be engaged in the research design, 
so that richer data can be secured. This does not require making the three orientations 
theoretically compatible but holding them in tension with each other, in order to 
illuminate the relative, contextual nature of the findings produced by each approach. In 
another application of social constructionism, this time to studies of strategic 
management practices in organizations, Samra-Fredericks (2008) shows how Foucault’s 
views of subject-constitutive discourse contribute to ‘researching the every-day fine 
grained constitution of phenomena’ (Samra-Fredericks 2008: 140). Similar studies of 
discourse-constructed organizational processes have been undertaken in 
entrepreneurship (e.g., Downing 2005).  
 
The combination of a radical subjectivism with the analysis of institutionalized systems 
of definition and control of the subject (Baudrillard 1988), and with a social theorizing 
of the human condition as ontologically and epistemologically contingent (Arendt 1958; 
Lyotard 1984; Heller and Feher 1989) has led to postmodernism, a paradigm of social 
and organizational research increasingly recognized as distinct. Postmodern thinking, 
characterized by an extensive relativization of knowledge foundations (Lyotard 1984) 
and a cultural turn (Rowlinson and Hassard 2014), has challenged the study of 
organizations to pursue innovative directions, such as the de-differentiation of 
phenomena and the blurring of boundaries between agency and structure (Clegg 1990), 
experimentation with post-bureaucratic organizational forms (Parker 1992), the 
20 
 
replacement of explanations based on institutional logics with a deeper understanding of 
‘signifying acts originating in imagination’, such as ‘social practices and rituals’ 
(Komporozos-Athanasiou and Fotaki 2015: 334), and emotional empathy and aesthetic 
appreciation of abuses of power, with a view to increasing individuals’ resistance to 
autonomy-suppressing organizing (Hayes et al. 2016).  
 
Both Foucauldian constructionism and postmodernism have been accused of ultra-
relativist ontologies and nihilist epistemologies leading to paralyzing despair in crucial 
issues of ethics, politics and praxis. Understanding agency as de-centred away from the 
individual and, instead, diffuse across complex social relationships is seen as severely 
impairing individuals’ capacity to induce social change (see Michael 1996; Newton 
(1998). This view of subjectification as implying loss of agency and power to effect 
social change has, however, been questioned by Caldwell (2007), who in response 
argues that, to move organizational research forward, ‘a synthetic and practice-oriented 
concept of agency would have to mediate between classical ideas of intentional action, 
autonomy and choice and ideals of embodied agency as always changing and always 
open to reinvention’ (Caldwell 2007: 21). 
 
To help overcome some of the limitations of current social constructionist research in 
organizations, Hosking (2011) proposes a new type of constructionism, namely, 
relational constructionism, which is arguably more appropriate for organizational 
research. Here the hard, essentialist self-other distinction is replaced by a soft, diffuse 
relation which assumes that persons and worlds emerge through dialogical processes. 
The most significant implication of this approach is that it affirms ‘dialogical practices 
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as ways of relating that can enable and support multiple local forms of life rather than 
imposing one dominant rationality on others’ (Hosking 2011: 47). Hosking’s proposal 
can be better understood in the context of responses to postmodernism from critical 
inquiry (in particular Habermasian theory of communicative action, 1984, 1985) and 
pragmatism (see Rorty 1992).  
 
Critical Inquiry 
 
Following the ontological and epistemological implications of social constructionism 
away from the (post)-positivist agenda and into a focus on ethical and political 
implications for qualitative research, we use the umbrella term ‘critical inquiry’ to label 
a wide spectrum of philosophical-theoretical perspectives where the values of the 
researcher are made explicit and called to legitimize the research process itself as a 
factor of both knowledge production and social change. Central to this movement is the 
intellectual tradition instigated by the Frankfurt School, with the works of Horkheimer 
(1947), Adorno (1966/2012), Marcuse (1964), and later Habermas (1971/2015, 1984-
1985) and Honneth (1991). Taking distance from previous aspirations (in both 
positivism and some forms of social constructionism) for research to be descriptive, 
explanatory and value neutral, critical theorists insist that values and value judgments 
are inescapable and that, consequently, research is a political act. Noting that claims of 
value neutrality at best unwittingly reinforce the status quo and at worst are used to fix 
the existing social order rather than explore alternatives, critical theorists advocate for 
social research linked to ‘a progressive political agenda’, which reveals ‘inequalities and 
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injustice’ (Baert 2005) and takes normative positions conducive to significant social 
change.  
 
Critical theory shares with the wider social constructionist and interpretivist movements 
the notion that social reality, shaped by economic and political forces into social 
structures, can only be known (inter)-subjectively. It is the emphasis on the role of 
values, as socially and historically constituted and mediated by power relations, that 
clearly distinguishes critical research programs from descriptive social constructionism. 
Inspired by an active care for human suffering, critical inquiry is attracted to contexts of 
disadvantage and discrimination – seeking to reveal silenced voices, emancipate 
oppressed social categories, and challenge the existing social order. Influenced by 
Marxist analysis and critique of ideology, the work of critical theorists illustrates how 
‘we can discover our real interests and the interests of those who encourage ideological 
delusion even when they themselves do not realize what their interests are’ (Rosenberg 
2008: 131). Rosenberg suggests that, while the application of Marxian theory to socio-
economic exploitation enacted in employment relations may have failed in practice, its 
fundamentals of ideology critique can still be fruitfully engaged in examining gender, 
race, or sexual orientation. For us, this explains why and how critical theory has proven 
to be a fertile ground for the emergence of a range of emancipatory social research 
perspectives and programs, such as feminism, critical race theory, queer theory and 
post-colonialism.  
 
In organizational research, critical theory has informed not only labour process theory, 
as the expression of a traditional Marxist interest in the political economy of labour-
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capital relations, but also many other spheres of social discrimination and inequality. As 
Alvesson and Deetz (2006: 259) point out,   
 
the central goal of critical theory in organizational studies has been to create 
societies and work places which are free from domination, where all members 
have an equal opportunity to contribute to the production of systems that meet 
human needs and lead to the progressive development of all.  
 
 
In doing so, critical management research has been established as an increasingly strong 
area of critique of not only traditional positivist and interpretivist paradigms but also of 
early Marxism, in particular its monistic materialism (Baert 2005). For example, Wray-
Bliss (2002) undertakes a critical analysis of British labour process research and shows 
how, despite an emancipatory agenda, it appropriates worker subjectivity and, in 
particular, the voices of women and other marginalized groups.  
 
According to Adler et al. (2007) and Thompson (2009), it is the task of critical 
management studies to revitalize labour process theory through an agenda of changing 
management practices by continuously questioning the political economy of the 
employment relationship in capitalism and thus seeking to transform it from within. 
More broadly, critical management research is defined as an anti-performative 
endeavour focusing on reflexivity, denaturalization of entrenched social practices and 
relations, deconstruction of ideology, and humanization of management practices in 
general (Fournier and Grey 2000). For this purpose, Mir and Mir (2002) apply Wright-
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Mills’ concept of sociological imagination to organizational practice, define the concept 
of organizational imagination, and argue for an active role of the researcher in 
questioning and transforming social institutions to benefit the powerless. Inspired by 
this idea, we can further suggest that the research imagination has developed new sub-
paradigms of emancipatory studies of organization. For example, Benschop and Verloo 
(2016) note that feminist approaches to organization studies (as outlined by Calás and 
Smircich, 1996/2006) have cross-fertilized with post-colonialist perspectives (see 
Prasad 2003; Westwood and Jack 2007; Westwood et al. 2014), leading to postcolonial 
feminism as a productive direction of organizational research (see Özkazanc-Pan 2015). 
Despite its seminal influence, critical management and organization research has also 
received its own, endogenous, critique. Fletcher and Seldon (2016), for instance, have 
recently evaluated and classified critical approaches to entrepreneurship, distinguishing 
between consensus and dissensus approaches – that is, those engaging in critique for 
entrepreneurship as a practice that requires reflection and improvement, and those 
adopting a critique of entrepreneurship itself as a fundamentally problematic practice.  
 
To summarize, in reaction to (post)positivism, interpretive paradigms such as social 
constructionism and critical theory (together with related emancipatory approaches) 
have earned the status of legitimate research projects in their own right, with 
philosophical-theoretical foundations just as rigorous as the positivist (Denzin and 
Lincoln 2011). However, while some organizational theorists (see Prasad and Prasad, 
2002) take a conciliatory position which does not seek to displace (post)positivism but 
achieve comparable legitimacy for interpretivist perspectives, critical theorists have 
consistently and fundamentally questioned the legitimacy of positivism (Fournier and 
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Grey 2000). This line of thought has also led to interventionist research in organizations 
(see Baard 2010), which seeks to not only critique the foundations of the social systems 
and structures observed but also to change them through the research process itself.  
 
Pragmatism  
 
Originally informed by American pragmatist philosophy, in particular James (1907), 
Dewey (1929/1984), Peirce (1934) and Rorty (1992), the pragmatist perspective in 
social research proposes that we should abandon any aspiration to forms of knowledge 
that transcend contextual (historical and cultural) boundaries and that truth itself is, can 
and should be defined in terms of successful consequences, depending on the values and 
interests embedded in the research endeavour as a social project (Baert 2005). Rorty 
(1992) agrees with Kuhn (1962) that there is no universal and perennial criterion of 
scientific success and that such criteria are culturally determined through conventions of 
the scientific community of each era. But pragmatists do not only criticize (post)-
positivism for its naturalist and mimetic fixations – that is, its ‘spectator theory of 
knowledge’, as Dewey (1929/1984: 19) puts it. They identify deeply seated 
deterministic tendencies in interpretivist and critical post-Marxist approaches as well. 
Both the American New Left, represented by Wright-Mills, for example, and the 
cultural Left of European source, derived from the works of Foucault (1979, 1988) and 
Derrida (1967) – the former for preserving residues of Marxist historical determinism, 
and the latter for inducing a new form of determinism through its self-referential 
discourse – are found unable to construct solutions and achieve political impact (Rorty 
1992). 
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As Habermas (1971/2015) suggests, at the intersection of pragmatism and critical 
theory, research (and especially social research) is a form of social action reflecting the 
cognitive interests and needs of a particular society’s research community. Hence, there 
is no essence that can be attributed to scientific inquiry as such, and knowledge 
develops through non-representational dialogue between historically and culturally 
situated researchers (Rorty 1992). At first sight, pragmatist epistemology may not 
appear different from its social constructionist and critical inquiry counterparts in any 
significant way. However, a clear point of pragmatist departure from all preceding 
paradigms is its interpretation of the role of values in the research project. Taking the 
view that axiological assumptions precede ontological and epistemological propositions 
leads pragmatists to locate paradigmatic tensions in the purpose of research rather than 
its methods (Baert 2005). Accordingly, pragmatist thinking does not reject (post)-
positivist methods if they are justified by acknowledged goals of prediction and control, 
and it accepts the legitimacy of social constructivist methods when the explicit aim of 
the research is interpretation. For this reason, pragmatism has proven one of the most 
tolerant perspectives with regard to multi-paradigm research, especially qualitative 
social research.  
 
Pragmatism’s flexibility is primarily due to its emphasis on questioning the classical 
dichotomies dividing the preceding paradigms, and on seeking to close the gaps. As 
summarized by Wicks and Freeman (1998), with respect to the objective-subjective 
distinction, pragmatists acknowledge that there is reality outside the subject but that 
there is no such thing as objective access to it. Accordingly, facts and interpretations are 
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inseparable, and all scientific discourse is just another narrative, with its own language 
game rules. But this is not a completely relativistic, anything-goes kind of game – for, if 
we regard research activity as directed by the need to solve practical problems rather 
than by a contemplative desire to describe the world to ourselves, then we are able to 
apply a consistent, inter-subjectively determined, criterion for relevant knowledge. 
Contextually defined and constrained, this criterion is also liberating, in that it enables 
us to select from multiple paradigms valuable elements of research method and practice 
without being sidelined in irrelevant (in pragmatist parlance, useless) disputes.  
 
In the context of organizational research, pragmatism can lead us to seek knowledge 
that is ‘useful in the sense of helping people to better cope with the world or to create 
better organizations’ (Wicks and Freeman 1998: 129). In this endeavour, epistemology 
and normative ethics of research go hand in hand. Multiple interpretations are not all 
indifferent or equal but pragmatically evaluated according to their relevance for given 
purposes established through social practice. Furthermore, pragmatism helps us distance 
ourselves more easily from our deeply ingrained conceptual frameworks – thus opening 
up new opportunities for avoiding undesirable self-fulfilling prophecies in socio-
economic behaviour (for example), and for imagining and enacting alternative 
behaviours.  
 
Given that many of the constituent terms of qualitative empirical studies of organization 
cannot be observed or measured, pragmatism may provide a legitimate and sufficiently 
effective alternative to truth-testing theories (McKelvey 2009). But, far from being anti-
theory, pragmatism emphasizes the need for researchers to strengthen the connection 
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between theory and practice, in a praxeological approach that improves theory by 
elevating its relevance requirements. This approach is particularly important for 
organizational management scholarship, as it provides a more effective balance between 
flexible choice of multiple research methods and unifying research standards (Wicks 
and Freeman 1998). Encouraged by the integrating effects of pragmatist applications in 
organizational research, some organizational theorists explicitly use pragmatism to 
justify the use of multiple paradigms and thus put an end to ‘the paradigm wars’ (Goles 
and Hirschheim 2000: 260). It has been found that paradigm pluralism has had a 
beneficial, albeit indirect, effect on the advancement of qualitative organizational 
research – for, in increasing the variety of research methods applied, it has enriched the 
potential for novel, valuable organization and management ideas to emerge (Goles and 
Hirschheim 2000).  
 
However, philosophical pragmatism has also had its fair share of criticism, on at least 
two accounts. First, due to its reliance on practical usefulness in epistemic evaluations, 
it has been accused of sliding into instrumentalist fallacies (Baert 2005), whereby 
emphasis on usefulness can lead to valuing means over ends, and to perverse effects 
such as having the intrinsic values of humanism succumb to technocratic priorities. We 
should also note that narrower views of what constitutes the practically relevant for a 
particular research community at a particular point in time may blind or bias thinkers 
against ideas ahead of their time. As history of humankind shows, great ideas may often 
prove to be out of sync with their time, so to speak, and only a disinterested, 
contemplative curiosity may be able to maintain a record of them, making it possible for 
their usefulness to be discovered much later, in unpredictable ways.  
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Second, pragmatism has been appraised by some philosophers as lacking in political 
sensitivity. While acknowledging that particular values and interests shape the research 
program of a particular community, it does not appear to be further refined to identify 
and question whose values and interests are actually being served – as a community 
experiencing a homogeneous or harmonious unity in this respect is difficult to imagine 
and even more difficult to obtain in practice. Due to an all-inclusiveness that encourages 
equality while glossing over power asymmetries that are pervasive in social settings 
(Hogan 2016), pragmatist research has been found wanting in the very humanism it 
professes, and thus yielding consequences that support the status quo. Noted in 
philosophy and social theory, these difficulties remain unresolved for organizational and 
management research as well – where they are particularly important, given the lack of 
humanism and the hegemonic influence of social-conservative ideologies still manifest 
in the study of organizations.  
 
A DILEMMA: PARADIGMATIC THINKING, OR FIRST-ORDER 
PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTION? 
 
Having explored several influential paradigms in qualitative organizational research, it 
is time we question the very idea of relying on already theorized paradigms as a 
substitute for independent philosophical reflection on our own research practice. 
Perhaps the qualitative organizational researcher, true to the fundamental role of 
reflexivity in their work, should beware of the stereotyping and reductionism that may 
result from adopting paradigmatic sets of philosophical assumptions based on historical-
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authoritative rather than self-reflective criteria. While some logical limitations can be 
identified in particular contexts, for most combinatorial associations or exclusions a 
significant exception can be expected. For example, it has often been assumed that a 
(post)-positivist ontology can hardly provide logical support for a social constructionist 
epistemology. However, precisely in organizational research, Borges et al. (2016) show 
that the two assumptions can function productively together, if understood in dialectical 
relation.  
 
A return to individual philosophical premises and to personalized, independently 
achieved foundational coherence in one’s qualitative research program is even more 
important in organization studies, where not only single paradigms but entire paradigm 
taxonomies have routinely been adopted as proxies for philosophical-theoretical 
documentation and justification of empirical studies. One such example is Burrell and 
Morgan’s (1979) general classification of paradigms of social research, along two axes 
(namely, objectivity – subjectivity; and regulation – radical change), into four 
categories: functionalism, interpretive paradigm, radical humanism, and radical 
structuralism. Out of the two axes, only one (objective versus subjective) pertains to 
philosophy as such – and it conflates ontology and epistemology without much 
explanation. The other (regulation versus radical change) belongs to the narrower, 
applied domain of social order theory. A nuanced evaluation of the benefits and limits 
of Burrell and Morgan’s taxonomy is offered by Scherer and Patzer (2008).  
 
One of the most widely applied paradigm classifications in organizational research, 
often used in field mapping exercises (see, for example, Grant and Perren 2002, or 
31 
 
Goles and Hirschheim 2000), Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) taxonomy has produced 
innovative contributions to management and organization theory in the context of 
encouraging multi-paradigm supported theory building and empirical research (see 
Gioia and Pitre 1990; Hassard 1991). However, it has also led to reductionist thinking, 
particularly in empirical studies. To address this problem, Deetz (1996) proposes that 
we should seek a deeper understanding of normative, interpretive, critical and dialogical 
studies in terms of the nature of their discourse.  
 
We note that, when paradigm classifications are applied uncritically, no further 
opportunity is taken to deepen reflection on the diversity and nuances of the 
philosophical assumptions involved. In fact, what are discussed are not individual 
philosophical assumptions but broad paradigmatic labels that facilitate grouping 
theories and (rather forcibly) articulating them with particular sets of generalizations.  
 
To overcome this difficulty, when exploring philosophical approaches relevant to 
specific directions and subfields, some organizational researchers have referred back to 
the basics of philosophical assumptions rather than uncritically adopting popular 
paradigm classifications. A good example of this is approach is Poole et al.’s (2000) 
own typology for research approaches in organisational change. Also, in an effort to 
address themselves in a relevant way to management practitioner-researchers, Gill and 
Johnson (2010) start from individual philosophical assumptions to illustrate the building 
blocks of the research process and the implications of adopting different assumptions. In 
this manner, they outline the discrete philosophical foundations of grounded theory, 
methodological monism, nomothetic and ideographic methods, and key philosophical 
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debates and disputes in interpretive analysis. Similarly, a good discussion of 
philosophical (especially praxeological) premises in qualitative organizational 
leadership research is provided by Klenke (2014). 
 
THE FUTURE OF QUALITATIVE ORGANIZATIONAL RESEARCH: 
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
 
Qualitative organizational research shares with other social science fields several 
concerns, such as: balancing the need to maintain explanatory power with sensitivity to 
an increasing diversity and complexity of social phenomena; articulating recognizable 
standards for qualitative research (despite the open plurality of methodological 
possibilities); and establishing areas of commensurability across different qualitative 
approaches (Spencer et al. 2014). Most of these challenges are related to ontological 
and epistemological assumptions. But there are also axiological (mainly, ethical) and 
praxeological challenges that are specific to the study of organizations, at least when 
considering its past and present. Therefore, a key question that must be raised at this 
point is: what should be the purpose of qualitative organizational research as purposeful 
human action? Or, to put it in political terms, how should qualitative organizational 
research be legitimized as social (and not just intellectual) practice?  
 
Given the long history of instrumentalist research in the organization and management 
fields, which has led to uncritical performativity (Fournier and Grey 2000; Wickert and 
Schaefer 2015), emphasis on the values of humanism and responsibility as intrinsic to 
any qualitative inquiry becomes paramount. In embracing humanism, however, 
33 
 
qualitative organizational research should be responsive to less dominant voices and 
contribute to their empowerment. As a whole field, it should take on, for instance, the 
challenge of postcolonial critique and be more open to non-Western philosophical 
assumptions and research methodologies. An interesting example of such an endeavour 
is the application of Eastern philosophy to research in strategy and management 
undertaken by Li (2012), who discusses Eastern Philosophy by taking an alternative 
approach to the very basic understanding of what constitutes a philosophical 
assumption. This approach, in turn, leads to innovative insights into how qualitative 
research could be conducted differently in the fields of strategy and management.  
 
In conclusion, qualitative organizational researchers need to reflect more deeply on the 
ways in which they use philosophy and theory to formulate and support their empirical 
research questions – so that they seek to contribute to knowledge more meaningfully, 
through problematization and challenging foundational assumptions rather than through 
literature gap spotting practices that reinforce established theoretical views (Alvesson 
and Sandberg 2011). In advancing research open to humanist priorities and self-
knowledge, qualitative organization and management scholarship should aspire to the 
epistemic standards and ethical values of a political philosophy of human action.  
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